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THE MACROECONOMICS OF POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA
AZ S TRACT
Macroeconomic populism is an approach to economics that emphasizes growth
and income distribution and deemphasizes the risks of inflation and deficit
finance, external constraints and the reaction of economic agents to
aggressive non-market policies. The purpose of our paper is to showthat
policy experiences in different countries and periods share conunon features,
from the initial conditions, the motivation for policies, the argument that
the country's conditions are different, to the ultimate collapse. Our
purpose in setting Out these experiences, thoseof Chile under Allende and
of Peru under Garcia, is not a righteous assertion of conservative
economics, but rather a warning that populist policies do ultimately fail;
and when they fail it is always at a frightening cost to the very groups who
were supposed to be favored. Our central thesis is that the macroeconomics
of various experiences is very much the same, even if the politics differed
greatly.
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This paper addresses the macroeconomics of populism in Latin
America. We mean by "populism" an approach to economicsthat emphasizes
growth and income redistribution and deeniphasizesthe risks of inflation
and deficit finance, external constraints and the reactionof economic
agents to aggressive non-market policies. The purposeof our paper is to
show that policy experiences in different countries and periodsshare
common features, from the initial conditions, the motivationfor policies,
the argument that the country's conditions are different, to theultimate
collapse. Our purpose in setting out these experiences, thoseof Chile
under Allende and of Peru under Garcia, is not a righteousassertion of
conservative economics, but rather a warning that populist policiesdo
ultimately fail; and when they fail it is always at a frighteningcoSt to
the very groups who were supposed to be favored. A centralthesis we
advance is that the macroeconomics of various experiences is verymuch the
same, even if the politics differed greatly.
We are struck by the strong similarities in Chile, Peru,and in
other episodes not developed in detail here of the way policy makers
viewed the objective conditions of their economy, how they proposedthat2
strongly expansionary policies should and could be carried out, andhow
they rationalized that constraints could be dealtwith.2 And, of course,
we are impressed by the fact that In the end, foreign exchangeconstraints
and extreme inflation forced a program of violent real wage Cuts that
ended in massive political instability, coups and violence. There is no
doubt in our mind about the sincerity of the policy makers who embark on
these programs, and we share their conviction that income distribution is
unacceptably unequal. The very sincerity of these policy makers convinces
us of theusefulness,and indeed the necessity of laying Out exactly how
and why the programs do go wrong.
The combination of external influences (debt crises,economic
blockades etc.), domestic policies (socialization of firms, bank
nationalization, etc.) and macroeconomic policies bring about an
unsustainable economy where inflation is out of control, and the foreign
exchange constraints force realism on policy makers. Accounts of these
experiences by sympathizers often emphasize politics and, especially,
external factors as central to the demise. Ourpurposeis not to belittle
these factors. There is no question in our mind that external
destabilization can be an important part of the unravelling of an economic
program. ut we want to emphasize that the extreme vulnerability that
makes destabilization possible is, by and large, the result of
unsustainable policies. This is one more reason to focus sharply on the
macroeconomics of populist programs.
2See Sachs (1989) and Dornbusch (1988b) for this same theme.3
In this paper, we analyze the most important historical features
of populist economic programs. We do this by contrasting the experiences
of Chile during Allende's Unidad Popular (1970-1973) and Peru under Alan
Garcia. It is clear that the Unidad Popular of 1970-73 experience in
Chile had political goals that were very different from the experience in
Peru. Even so, we want to emphasize that the political mobilization
strategy had strongly similar elements. Moreover, we will show that there
are remarkable similarities between the Allende experience and that of
Alan Garcia's Peru. In fact, we believe that an important cause of the
Peruvian economic catastrophe was that the architects of the program, and
their economic advisors, failed to learn the lessons of recent Latin
American history and, in particular, of Allende's Chile.
I. THE POPULIST PARADIGM
Populism has traditionally been a fuzzy concept. In fact, for
many years political scientists have struggled to provide a meaningfuland
precise definition. Drake (1982) emphasizes three elements of a tentative
definition: populism uses "political mobilization, recurrent rhetoric and
symbols designed to inspire the people", it draws on a heterogeneous
coalition aimed primarily at the working class, but including and led by
significant sectors from the middle and upper strata and, third, populism
"has conoted a reformist set of policies tailored to promote development
without explosive class conflict. He notes (Drake (1982,p.2l8)4
"[The programsi normally respond to the problems of underdevelopment
by expanding state activism to incorporate the workers in a process
of accelerated industrialization through ameliorative redistributive
measures."
Conniff (1982,p.S) has argued that "populist programs
frequently overlapped with those of socialism". We emphasize that the
redistributive objectives are a central part of the paradigm. Whether
they are motivated by a strategy of massive social reform is
consequential, but is not central to our discussion.
We have asserted above that many populist economic programs
exhibit strong similarities. In this section, we set out in paradigmatic
fashion what we see as the critical common factors. In later sections we
document these for the experiences of Chile and Peru.3
Seers (1964) summarized the great difficulty in achieving
consensus in the debate between "monetarists" and "structuralists." The
names have changed, but the discussion between those who emphasize the
limited scope for financial experiments and others who see the need for
social progress and are impatient about the means, who believe the special
conditions of their country yields a fruitful yet unexploited strategy for
social progress continues. As Seers (l964,p.89) states:
"This is not just a technical issue in economic theory. At the hearty
of the controversy between "monetarists" and "structuralists" are two
different ways of looking at economic development, in fact two
31n a larger project we expect to look at a significant number of experience
LatinAmericato get a sharper picture of the phases and ultimate breakdown
programs.5
completely different attitudes toward the nature of social change,
two different sets of value judgments about the purposes of economic
activity and the ends of economic policy, and two incompatible views
on what is politically possible."
The populist paradigm is typically a reaction against a
"monetarist" experience. The phases of the experience are the following:
• Initial Conditions. The country has experienced slow growth,
stagnation or outright depression as a result of previous stabilization
attempts. The experience, typically under an IMF program, has reduced
growth and living standards. Serious economic inequality provides
economic and political appeal for a radically different economic program.
The receding stabilization will have improved the budget and the external
balance sufficiently to provide the room for, though perhaps not the
wisdom of, a highly expansionary program.
• No Constraints: Policy makers explicitly reject the
conservative paradigm. Idle capacity is seen as providing the leeway for
expansion. Existing reserves and the ability to ration foreign exchange
provide room for expansion without the risk of running into external
constraints. The risks of deficit finance emphasized in traditional
thinking are portrayed as exaggerated or altogether unfounded. Expansion
is not inflationary (if there is no devaluation), because spare capacity
and decreasing long run Costs contain cost pressures and; there is room to
squeeze profit margins by price controls.6
The Policy Prescription. Populist programs emphasize three
elements: reactivation, redistribution of income and restructuring of the
economy. The common thread here is "reactivation with redistribution". The
recommended policy is a redistribution of income, typically by large real
wage increases. Inflation notwithstanding, devaluation is rejected
because of the inflationary impact and because it reduces living
standards. The economy is to be restructured to save on foreign exchange
and support higher levels of real wages and higher growth.
• Phase I: In the first phase, the policy makers are fully
vindicated in their diagnosis and prescription: growth of output, real
wages and employment are high, and the macroeconomic policies are nothing
short of successful. Controls assure that inflation is not a problem, and
shortages are alleviated by imports. The run-down of inventories and the
availability of imports (financed by reserve decumulation or suspension of
external payments) accommodates the demand expansion with little impact on
inflation.
• Phase II: The economy runs into bottlenecks, partly as a
result of a strong expansion in demand for domestic goods, and partly
because of a growing lack of foreign exchange. Whereas inventory
decumulation was an essential feature of the first phase, the low levels
of inventories and inventory building are now a source of problems. Price7
realignments and devaluation, exchange control, or protectionbecome
necessary. Inflation increases significantly,but wages keep up. The
budget deficit worsens tremendously as aresult of pervasive subsidies on
wage goods and foreign exchange.
• Phase III: Pervasive shortages, extreme acceleration of
inflation, and an obvious foreign exchange gap lead to capital flightand
demonetization of the economy. The budget deficit deteriorates violently
because of a steep decline in tax collection and increasing subsidy costs.
The government attempts to stabilize by cutting subsidies and by areal
depreciation. Real wages fall massively, and politics becomeunstable. It
becomes clear that the government has lost.
• Phase IV: Orthodox stabilization takes over under a new
government. An IMF program will be enacted; and, when everythingis said
and done, the real wage will have declined massively, to a level
significantly lower than when the whole episode began! Moreover,that
decline will be very persistent, because the politics and economicsof the
experience will have depressed investment and promoted capital flight.The
extremity of real wage declines is due to a simple fact: capitalis mobile
across borders, but labor is not.
We now turn to the experience of Peru and Chile to study in more
detail the policy makers' diagnosis and the actual events. We startwith
the Chilean case, because the facts of the entire experience can be seen.
The results suggest what to look for in the Peruvian experience.8
II.ECONOMICPOLICIES IN ALLENDES CHILE
In September of 1970, after a hard-fought election, Salvador
Allende, the socialist candidate of the Unidad Popular (UP), was elected
President of Chile. For Chile, this was the beginning of a unique
political and economic experience that continues to be analyzed and
discussed today.4 The Unidad Popular was a political coalition of left
and center-left parties dominated by the Socialist and Communist parties,
both of which had a Marxist-Leninist ideology and aspired, in the long
run, to construct an orthodox socialist type society. The smaller parties
comprising the coalition were of Christian democrat, middle class
extraction. Although they backed profound structural changes, they did
not subscribe to the Leninist view of the world.5
Both communists and socialists initially recognized the
inulticlass hature of the Unidad Popular and considered the alliance and
the politics that sustained it to be a tactical intermediate step that
would help set the basis for the transition to socialism.6 Vuscovic
(l973,p.5O) noted:
"..economic policy is subordinate, in its content, shape and form, to
the political need for increasing the Popular Unity's support. .. .The
urgent need to achieve rapid recovery of the economy, and to extend
the benefits to the mass of the working population, cannot be
undertaken in isolation from the structural changes; they are all
necessarily interdependent. It is not possible to make deeper changes
See Oppenheim (1989) for a recent review of the literature.
See Stallings (1978) and de Vlyder (1974) for a discussion of politics and
conomics in Chile.
See the discussion in Zammit (1973).9
without broadening the Government's political support, and economic
reactivation and income redistribution will provide an impulse to
these fundamental changes."
The UP program called for deep institutional and economic
reforms, including the replacement of the bicameral congress by a unique
legislative body --the"People's Assembly", and the nationalization of
the mining, banking and, agricultural sectors and a substantial nuxnber of
large manufacturing firms. All of this was to be accomplishedwithin the
existing legal framework. The program called for a democratic"Chilean
road to socialism."
The UP program, and most of the technical literature written by
the UP economists, characterized the pre-1970 economy as "monopolistic"
and "dependent."This diagnosis was strongly influenced by the
structuralist thought developed in the United Nations Economic Commission
for Latin America (CEPAL) during the l960s. Many of the top officials in
the administration were, in fact, CEPAL staff (on leave). It was argued
by the UP program, and in the related literature, that the mostserious
problems faced by the country were unequal income distributionand chronic
inflation and unemployment. It was also argued that the structure of
internal demand, the semipermanent crisis in the external sector andthe
low level of capital accumulation conspired to prevent a sufficiently high
rate of growth. It was then postulated that the implementationof deep
institutional reforms -- or"revolutionary reforms" according to the
jargon of that time -- plusimprovement in the distribution of income10
would not only constitute an important step towards the constructionof
socialism, but would also generate a fast pace of growth for the economy.
Upon taking power in 1970. the Unidad Popular faced asomewhat
stagnated economy with a rapidly increasing rate of inflation.Between
1967 and 1970, real GDP per capita grew only at 1.2% --significantly
below the Latin American average --whileurban unemployment crept up to
9.2% in 1970. Inflation, on the other hand, had steadily increased during
the last few years of the Frei administration, reaching 35% in 1970. On
the positive side, the external sector was in good shape; the balance of
payments had experienced substantial surpluses during all but oneof the
Frei years. As a result of this, when Dr. Allende became president, the
central bank had a significant stock of international reserves of
approximately $400 million U.S. or half a year of imports.
111.1 The Short Run Economic Prpzram
The most important short run economic objective of the UP
included:
• initiating, at a rapid speed, a whole range of structural
economic transformations, including the nationalization program;
• raising real wages, especially for the lower classes;
• reducing inflation;
• increasing the rate of output growth;
• increasing consumption, especially amongthepoorer groups and
• reducing the economy's dependence on the rest of the world.11
The first objective -- thenationalization program -- wasto be
achieved by a combination of new legislation, requisitions, and stock
purchases from small shareholders. The other goals --outputand
consumption growth, with rising salaries and declininginflation -- were
to be accomplished by a macroeconomic policy characterized by anincrease
in aggregate demand, mainly generated by higher government expenditures,
accompanied by income redistribution measures and severe administrative
controls over prices.
This macroeconomic program followed the structuralist tradition
and was based on a number of key assumptions. First, it was believed that
there was ample excess capacity in the manufacturing sector. Second, it
was thought that this low rate of capacity utilization was closelyrelated
to the existing pattern of consumption and income distribution. Third,it
was assumed that there was a dualistic manufacturing sector, wherefirms
producing "luxury" goods had excessively high capital/labor ratios.
Fourth, inflation was considered to be a reflection of the economic
structure, not of financial or monetary pressures. In what follows, we
will analyze these four key assumptions in some detail.
The assumption of significant excess capacity in the manufacturing sector
was at the center of the short run macroeconomic program and providedthe
intellectual base for the belief that large fiscal deficits would not
necessarily be inflationary. This view is clearly captured in the
following statement made by Americo Zorrilla, Allende's first Ministerof
Finance:
"The subutilization of installed capacity is another feature of
the current economic situation ...In1969 it was possible to12
increase production, due to subutilization, by more than 30 percent
[A]ccording to recent studies ...unutilizedcapacity has
reached, in the last few years, 61 percent in the cloth industry, 50
percent in the baking industry ...74percent in the shoe industry,
etc. (As reproduced in Garcia, 1972, p. 72)
An important corollary of the unutilized capacity hypothesis was
that firms in many sectors faced decreasing average costs so that, under
proper administrative price controls, demand increases would not generate
inflationary pressure. Moreover, to the extent that many of the larger
firms were indeed nationalized, as called for by the UP program, output
could be greatly increased even with price reductions. In a docuiuent
prepared by the Planning Office (ODEPLAN) in 1971, it was stated that by
"combining the increase in production derived from a higher use installed
capacity ...theformer monopolies will be able to absorb, without
problems, the required wage increases, while maintaining, or even
reducing, prices and still generating the same surplus".
Thelackof "full" utilization was, in turn, attributed to two
fundamental factors: The previously mentioned monopolistic nature of the
manufacturing industry and, the structure of income distribution.
According to this interpretation, the unequal income distribution resulted
in a highly diversified pattern of consumption. Vuskovic stated this view
as follows:
"(There is) ...anobvious association between income
distribution and the composition of demand and, consequently, the
structure of production ...Givencurrent income distribution ... the
effective market is limited to higher income groups ... [I]tis a
restricted ...andhighly diversified demand ...(A]broad range of
industries producing nonessential consumption goods operate an
insufficient scale ... (Vuskovic,1970)13
Based on this diagnosis, it was thought that if income was
redistributed towards the poorer groups through wage increases and prices
were properly controlled, there would be a significant expansionof demand
and output. According to Sergio Sitar, former Minister of Mining in the
Allende government,
"[I]n order to expand demand there would be a hike in white and blue
collar workers salaries, and there would be an increase in government
expenditure on education, health, housing and public works.'
(Sitar, 1979, p. 78)
And with respect to the price effects of these measures, he said:
"Since there was a substantial margin for expanding supply, it was
concluded that the increase in demand would not provoke an
acceleration of inflation. With respect to costs, severe price
controls were supposed to ensure that the higher wages would not be
passed on to prices ...Sincesales were supposed to grow
substantially, global profits in each firm would be affected only
slightly, even though the per unit profit would decline .
(Sitar,1979, p. 79)
An important component of this short term macroeconomic program
was the existence of substantial international reserves. It was expected
that because of these reserves, the expansion of demand would not run into
foreign-exchange related bottlenecks. Moreover, the program expectedthat
the nationalization of the large copper mines plus planned increases in
copper production would allow the central bank tomaintain a relatively
high level of international reserves.
In spite of the fundamental role assigned to increasing capacity
utilization, the UP economic team was aware that investment was required14
to sustain the expansion in the medium to long run. Here,however, the
program was based on two important assumptions.The first was that with
the new structure of demand, lower investment would be requiredto achieve
significant growth. This was based on thebelief that until 1970 the
industrial structure had emphasized on the production of "luxury"goods,
which required excessively high capital/labor ratios. It was arguedthat
basic consumption goods, however, had a much lower capital/output
requirement. A very convenient side effect of this changein the demand
structure was that employment could grow very fast. VuskoviC's
fundamental article captures this view quite vividly:
[Tihe new dynamic sectors ...will,in general, be characterized by
lower capital requirements and greater capacity to absorb labor;
consequently, a rapid increase in savings and capital formationwill
cease to be a requisite to accelerate the global rate of growth .
(Vuskovic,1970, p. 58)
Regarding inflation, the UP program followed the structuralist
approach, which emphasized rigidities, bottlenecks, and the roleof
monopolistic pricing and played down the role of fiscal pressures and
money creation.7 In accordance with this position, the UP paid very
little attention to the financial sector when implementing its short run
program. In fact, in his memoirs, the former Allende Ministerand Vice
President Clodomiro Almeyda relates how in the first meeting of the
economic team after the elections the CEPAL-oriented technocrats
expressly, and convincingly it would seem, argued that monetary and
7See Sunkel (1960) for a discussion of structuralist inflation theory. See, too,
Baer and Kersternetzky (1964).15
financial management did not deserve too muchattention.8 Alfonso
Inostroza, the President of the Central Bank, stated in early1971 that
the main objective of the monetary policy was to
"transform it into a key instrument ...toachieve the complete
mobilization of productive resources, and their allocation to those
areas that the government gives priority to ..
Thefinal component of the short run program referred to
reducing Chile's external vulnerability. The UP basic programstated that
a priority of the new government would be to "execute a foreigntrade
policy tending to expand and diversify our exports ..."(UnidadPopular
1969, p. 24). What is interesting, however, is that this objective was to
be achieved without providing any price incentives. Quite the contrary,
the UP economists thought that changes in the exchange rate had very
little, if any, effects on exports or imports. In fact, in the same
paragraph where the program called for expanding and diversifying exports
it was stated that an important goal of the policy was to "avoid the
scandalous devaluations of [the) ...currency"(p. 24). In line with this
belief, one of the first measures undertaken by the Allende administration
was to eliminate the system of crawling peg that had been adopted,with
great success, by the Frei administration. It was expected,then, that
expansion of exports would be the result of administrative decisions
geared towards centralizing foreign tradeactivities.10
8See, for example, the 1971 ClAP Report reproduced in Panorama EconomiCO, No.260
Feb. -March 1971, p.36.
9See Inostroza (l97l,p.8).
10See Plan Anual 1971 (Odeplan, 1971).16
An important, indeed crucial, objective of the economic program
was to broaden the UP's political base of support very quickly.The UP
leaders thought that it was necessary to obtain the support of the middle
classes and, more specifically, to draw a large number of voters that had,
until then, supported the Christian Democrats into the UP in order to move
towards a socialist system. This political objective plays a significant
role in explaining the heavily populist content of the short run program
and should be kept in mind when evaluating the short term achievements of
the Allende government.
To sum up, the short run macroeconomic program of the UP was
aimed at provoking a rapid economic recovery after years of semi-
stagnation and at generating a significant improvement in the living
conditions of the poorer groups. The main tool for achieving this was a
fast growth in government expenditures geared especially at increasing the
real incomes of the lower classes. The intellectual underpinnings of this
plan were basically given by the structuralist model that attributes a
great role to rigidities and bottlenecks and looks with great contempt at
the financial and monetary sectors. A key element of the plan was the
belief that, if channeled to the appropriate groups and if accompanied by
the right kind of administrative controls, fiscal deficits would not be
inflationary.
Needless to say, this view of the way the economy functioned
ignored many of the key principles of traditional economic theory. This
was not only reflected by the greatly diminished role given to monetary17
policies, but also by the complete ignoring of the real exchange rate as a
key variable in determining macroeconomic equilibrium. Moreover,the
macroeconomic view of the Unidad Popular failed to recognize that their
policies would only be able to generate a burst of economic activity that
would be unsustainable in the medium term if the transition from recovery
to sustainable growth was not handled with extraordinary circumspection.
Also, the UP technocrats greatly underestimated the role of expectations
and the capacity of the public to react to severe inflationary pressures.
gitar (1986, chapter 5) portrays very clearly the government's inability
to control events, to shift from redistribution to accumulation.
"It turned out to be very difficult to contain the forces unleashed
in 1971. The sequential conception of redistribution followed by
accumulation assumed that basic political and social conduct could be
altered and popular expectations changed virtually instantaneously.
In the next few months (early 19723 it proved impossible to apply
this thinking with the facility that had been hoped for."
111.2 The First Year: Raoid Growth With Reoressed Inflation
Armed with the intellectual framework analyzed above, the UP rapidly began
to implement its program in late 1970. In terms of structural reforms,
two basic measures were immediately undertaken:11 First, the Agrarian
Reform was greatly intensified with a very large number of farms being
expropriated. Second, a project for a Constitutional Amendment aimed at
nationalizing the large copper mines -- untilthen jointly owned by large
U.S. firms and the Chilean state --wasstudied.12 Their reforms of the
11The agrarian reform law passed by Congress during the Frei administration provided
the necessary tool. See Alauf et al (1972).
120n June 11, 1971, Congress unanimously approved the constitutional reform that
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banking system and large manufacturing firms were somewhat more difficult,
because the government lacked the institutional channels for implementing
the nationalization program. Initially, this obstacle was overcome by
purchasing blocks of shares -- especiallybank shares -- atvery high
prices. These acquisitions were, in turn, financedwith loans from the
Central Bank to the CorDoracion de Fomento de l.a Produccion (CORFO).
These acquisitions were complemented by a process of requisition
based on an old, and until then forgotten, decree law promulgated during
the short lived Socialist Republic of 1932.
In terms of macroeconomic policy, the government rapidly applied
measures that were consistent with its program. Salaries and wagesin the
public sector were raised, on average in 1971, with wages for thelower
segments of the bureaucracy increasing relatively faster thanthose for
the higher echelons. Salaries in the private sector grew at approximately
the same rate. Unions used public section salary adjustments as a
benchmark in their negotiations. Figure 1 shows the gain in real wages.
Also, government expenditures were greatly boosted via the so-called
"Special Programs for Expansion and Development." This higher expenditure
was mainly directed towards construction, farming and socialsecurity13
and was financed with loans from the Central Bank (i.e., with money
creation). The short run package was topped by a severe and quite
generalized scheme of price controls.
13The new program assigned 66% of its resources to these three sectors.19
The expansion of demand quickly affected sales and production.
During the first and second quarters of 1971, manufacturing output
increased 6.2% and 10.6% compared to the same periods in the previous
year. Manufacturing sales grew at evenfaster rates: 12% during the
first quarter and 11% during the second quarter. Overall, 1971 was a good
year. Real CDP grew at 7.7 percent, average wagesincreased by 17
percent, aggregate consumption grew at a real rate of 13.2 percent,and
the rate of unemployment dipped below 4 percent. Not too surprisingly,
given the behavior of real wages, there was a significant improvementin
income distribution. In 1971 labor's share of GOP reached 61.7 percent,
almost 10 points higher than its 1970 level of 52.3 percent; and this
happened without an acceleration of inflation. What was even more
important for the UP was that the policies rapidly paid off politically.
In the municipal elections of 1971, the UP parties saw their share of the
vote climb from the 36% they had received in the 1970 presidential
election to around 50%.14
Needless to say, all of this created a sense of euphoria in the
government. The program was working as planned. The fact that the fiscal
deficit had jumped from less than 3% of CDP in 1970 to almost 11% in 1971
did not worry the UP technocrats. Nor did they think much of the fact
that the rate of growth of the money supply had surpassed 100 percent in
annual terms in the fourth quarter of 1971, and that the rate of growth of
14The strong showing in early municipal or congressional elections was not uncommon
in Chile. In fact, the Frei government had a similar experience in 1965.20
domestic credit to the public sector was approaching 300 percent.All of
this, in fact, was part of the plan. When evaluatingthe results from the
first year of Allende's government, Julio Lopez, a prominentUP economist,
stated that "the economic recovery policy was based on a significant
increase ... inthe government deficit. We ignored those orthodox
recommendations that look for ...budgetequilibrium." And, then, he said
that it was precisely because of these policies that it was possible to
"achieve the political objective of quantitatively broadening the baseof
support for the government".
Of course, these macro policies were rapidly generating a highly
explosive situation of repressed inflation. The rapid growthof GDP in
1971 rested heavily on an almost 40% increase in the imports of
intermediate goods. As a result, the stock of international reserves
inherited by the Allende government was reduced by more than one halfin
that year alone. A steep reduction of inventories was another important
factor contributing to the expansion of consumption.
By the end of 1971, the mounting inflationary pressuresbecame
evident. The combination of the expansion in demand and pricecontrols
resulted in growing scarcity of some consumption goods. Production
resporses, on the other hand, became more and more sluggish.The supply
problem was aggravated by a series of labor disputes in many large
establishments that resulted in the takeover of those firms by their
workers. In fact, this procedure became the institutionalized wayin
which the government seized a large number of firms. The governmentmade21
use of a 1932 Decree-Law that provided that whenever a labor dispute
generated a serious disruption in supply, the authorities could take over
the firm in question.
By the end of 1971, the government had used this channel to
expropriate more than 40 large firms. Naturally, this process disrupted
production not only in the firms that were seized but also in the rest of
the industrial sector where uncertainty was quickly mounting. Moreover,
the level of productivity in the nationalized firms began to drop rapidly.
contrary to the thinking of the architects of the UP plan, these firms
generated no surpluses but instead incurred huge losses that resulted in
additional pressures on the government's budget.
111.3 The Second Year: Failed Stabilization Pro&rams
During 1972, the macroeconomic problems continued to mount. As can be
seen in Table 1, in that year inflation reached 217% and the fiscal
deficit surpassed 13% of CD?. The rate of growth of domestic credit to the
public sector reached almost 300%, and international reserves dipped below
$77 million.22
Table 1 Chile: Main Macroeconomic Indicators
1970 1971 1972 1973
Inflationa 34.9 34.5 216.7 605.9
Growth 2.1 9.0 -1.2 -5.6
Real Wages (1970:3—100) 98.4 115.1 103.5 70.3
Gov't. Revenueb 23.7 20.4 18.2 20.2
Gov't. Spendin 26.4 31.1 31.2 44.9
Budget DeficitU 2.7 10.7 13.0 24.7
Money Growtha 52.9 99.3 100.9 264.4
Int'l. Reserves ($Mill.) 320 129 95 36
Trade Balance ($Miii. 246 73 -161 -73
Black Market Premium 99 358 898 2349
a Percent of GDP b Percent, Dec. -Dec.
Sources: Yanez (1978); Banco Central de Chile; International Monetary
Fund; Edwards (1986); Edwards and Edwards (1987), Solimano (1988).
What was even more serious was the continuous growth of the
underground economy. As more and more activities moved out of theofficial
economy, more and more sources of tax revenues disappeared.In this
context, a serious vicious cycle took over. Repressed inflation encouraged
the informal economy, which in turn resulted in reduced taxes, higher
deficits, and, thus, in even higher inflation. In 1972, two
stabilization programs were implemented, and failed.
When evaluating the causes of difficulties, the dominant view
among UP economists was that the authorities had failed to impose
appropriate controls in implementing the program. For example,when
discussing the severe external crisis already evident in late 1971,Garcia
argued that it was incorrect to attribute the loss of reserves tothe23
significant real overvaluation of the escudo. He then pointed out,
matter-of-factlY, that "since the Central Bank has the power, and
administrative mechanisms, to slow down imports, it is possible to control
them [imports] without devaluing ..."(Garcia.1972, p. 206). And with
respect to the overall strategy, he recommended that in order to solve the
mounting disequilibrium "the State should, necessarily, increase the
degree of direct control .. ." (Garcia1972, p. 255).
This dominant view was indeed the one that guided the first,
rather weak, attempt at stabilizing the economy which was launched in
February of 1972.15 This package sought to:(a) solve the problems
derived from the growing underground economy and the related scarcity of
goods at official prices; (b) avoid an outburst of inflation; (c)
maintain, or further improve, income redistribution; and (d) solve the
serious crisis of the external sector. However, no serious measures aimed
at solving these problems were undertaken. For instance, it was argued
that it was not convenient to reduce government expenditures, the policy
of granting salary increases that exceeded inflation was maintained, and a
significant devaluation was ruled out)6
The combination of generalized price controls and unchecked
fiscal and monetary policies acted as a major encouragement for the black
15Bitar (1986) in his insider's account of policy making tells of how this view was
opposed by a small group of technocrats who argued for a correction of the
fundamental source of the disequilibrium. But they encountered two difficulties, the
technical accuracy of their position was in doubt and the politics of major budget
exchange rate correction was perceived to be too costly.
In 1971 a small devaluation was followed by the institution of four separate
exchange rates.24
market economy. What made things even worse was that the government
completely lost control over wages. Unions in bothnationalized and
private firms demanded increasingly higher wage adjustments.This
produced a dilemma for the government. If ithad refused to grant the
wage adjustments. it would helpthe macroeconomy but deeply hurt its
political constituency and objectives. Under these circumstances,the
government chose, every time, to uphold its revolutionarylabel.
Moreover, a number of economists argued that higher real wages couldbe
sustained as long as the government was able, via increased controls, to
extract additional "surplus" from the privatesector.17
y mid-1972, it became apparent that the February stabilization
program was a failure. The underground economy was now generalized.
output began to fall, open inflation reached an annual rateof 70 percent
in the second quarter, foreign exchange reserves were only $82 million,
and the black market rate was climbing at a very fast pace (see Figure 2).
From a political perspective, what made the situation particularly
difficult was that parliamentary elections were scheduled for March of
1973. It was increasingly clear that the economic crisis was going to
work against the UP in those elections. In August of that year, andunder
the political overview of the Communists, a new stabilization program was




































































































































Unlike the previous plan, the cornerstone of the August program
was a massive devaluation of the escudo. The exchange rate for imports
was raised by almost 90 percent, while that for exports increased by 33
percent. It was expected that, as a result, the ever.mounting pressures
on the balance of payments would subside. The program called for two
basic measures to contain the fiscal pressures. First, price increases
for the nationalized firms were authorized. It was thought that their
losses would decline and, consequently, there would be a reduction in the
rate creation required to finance the newly formed nationalized sector.
Second, the program called for a massive increase in production as the
major way to close the gap between aggregate supply and aggregate demand.
This increase in output was expected to r be a response to Doliticat
rather than economic incentives. In fact, at that time, the Communist
Party's main slogan became "Let'swinthe battle for increased
production!" The devaluation immediately affected the prices of those
goods not still subject to severe controls. This plus the authorization
of a large number of price increases resulted in a rate of price increase
of 22.7% in August and 22.2% in September.
In spite of the action taken on the exchange rate front,the
program was destined to fail as no change in the wage rates policy was
introduced. In the second week of August, the government announced that
it had reached an agreement with the national federation of workers
(Central Unica de Trabaladores, CUT) with respect to an across-the.board
wage adjustment to be granted on October 1st except for firms subjectto26
private bargaining. The new wage policy called for an increase in public
and private sector wages by a proportion equal to the accumulated rate of
inflation between January and September. In addition, the new policy
called for more frequent wage adjustments.11-8 In this way, by a stroke of
the pen, the effects of the devaluation were fully offset.
In order to combat the general scarcity of goods and of food in
particular, the government tried to organize a rationing scheme, where a
certain amount of food (the so-called "popular basket") was made available
to each household through neighborhood organizations specially created for
this purpose. This rationing scheme, however, generated a massive
reaction by the opposition, who argued that Chile was being transformed
into "another Cuba". In October, 1972, the opposition parties organized a
national strike as a protest against what were considered to be erroneous
and antidemocratic government policies. The protest was particularly
directed against the governments economic and educational policies. This
strike generated significant economic costs and greatly aggravated the
situation. In fact, the strike could only be solved after President
Allende included representatives of the armed forces in his cabinet.
111.4 The Third Year: Economic Chaos and Coup
During the first quarter of 1973 chile's economic problems reached chaotic
proportions. Compared to the first quarter of 1972, inflation reached
22%; industrial output declined by almost 6%; the real exchange rate was
18QuePasaNo.70, August 17th, 1972,p. 14.27
even more overvalued, and foreign exchange held by theCentral Bank was
barely above $40 million. The black market by now covered every single
transaction in foreign exchange. The fiscal deficit continued to climb as
a result of ever higher expenditures and of rapidly disappearing sources
of taxation. In that year, the fiscal deficit exceeded 23% of GDP!
Once more the government faced the options of implementing a
major corrective stabilization program or of furthering the extentof
controls. And once again it opted for the latter. This decision, made in
March of 1973. sealed the fate of the government. The extent of the
economic crisis quickly alienated the middle classes; and, after March
1973, the political confrontation with the opposition became increasingly
severe. Of course, it must be remembered that, in the midst of this
polarization, the support commanded by Allende actually grew: whereasin
1970 the UP received the votes of 30% of the electorate, its share rose to
44 percent in 1973.
The opposition, after an important victory in the parliamentary
elections of March 1973, became extremely impatient. By mid-1973, the
opposition parties were demanding the resignation of President Allende.
In addition, an even more serious problem within the UP was developing.
The UP parties -- inparticular the Communists and Socialists -- had
entered into a serious feud, strongly disagreeing on how to face the
crisis.
In concluding, we must comment on the role of domestic economic
opposition and the foreign economic blockade. There is littledoubt chat28
the strategic use of economic disruption by the opposition, foreign
enterprises and foreign governments played a role in the ultimate
unravelling of the Allende policies. We doubt, although we certainly
cannot demonstrate this point, that a more neutral external environment
would have allowed the Allende experiment to continue for a significant
period. Our view is that the uncontrolled side effects of the growth
policy (shortages, inflation etc.) sufficiently weakened then ability to
govern, so economic destabilization by domestic opposition forces and
foreign companies and governments could be effective. We advance this view
as a hypothesis and propose further research to substantiate this critical
feature of the unravelling of populist experiences.
On the 11th of September 1973, the Allende presidency came to a
sudden and shocking end. That day the armed forces staged a coup. When
the military took over, the country was politically divided and the
economy was in shambles. Inflation was galloping, relative price
distortions -- stemmingmainly from massive price controls -•were
generalized; black market activities were rampant; real wages had dropped
drastically; the economic prospects of the middle class had been greatly
damaged; the external sector was facing a serious crisis; production and
investment were falling steeply; and the government finances were
completely out of hand. This was the stage where frightful real wage
cutting (see Figure 1 above) took over.19
19Even if the real wage decline of 1974-75 is inpart due to the dramatic terms of
trade deterioration, one should not minimize the aftermath of the Allende policies.29
III. GROWTH WITH REDISTRIBUTION IN GARCIA'S PERU
When Alan Garcia assumed the Peruvian Presidency in August 1985,
he captured the world's imagination: a dynamic, charismatic leader taking
charge of a country desperately in need of social and economic progress.
The fact that he adopted a confrontational attitude on external debt did
not hurt his image, either in Latin America or in progressive circles in
Europe and the United States. On the domestic front, he had an unambiguous
message: growth and redistribution. That policy lasted two years before
running aground in a catastrophic manner.
In early 1988, Alan Garcia's populist government staged a
dramatic turnaround on the policies that had driven the country to
bankruptcy and near-hyperinflation: budget cutting, real wage cutting and
massive exchange depreciation were the predictable aftermath of three
years of reckless mismanagement. But that is unlikely to be the end of the
story. Even if the economic measures were to succeed, the political
consequences are still to come. Real wage cutting and austerity, in the
Peruvian Context, may well be the opening phase for massive and perhaps
violent confrontations.
More so than in any other country of Latin America, economic
performance is central to maintaining the very precarious social peace in
Peru. At issue is not only the possible confrontation between left and
right. Far more dangerous is the widening conflict opened by the Maoist30
Shinin Pathguerilla.The Outcome is wide open because of the divisions
between rich and poor, the city and the sierras, white and indios. Further
deterioration of economic performance with declining per capita incomes,
explosive inflation and real wage cutting would make Peru ungovernable.
Yet these events almost certainly lie ahead. Unless a massive improvement
of export prices or external assistance on a major scale provide foreign
exchange resources to help achieve (together with policy reform) a gradual
adjustment, an out-and-out economic crisis is inevitable.
11.1 From Belaunde to Garcia2°
In the l950s and 1960s Peru experienced significant growth of
real per capita income and moderate inflation. Cable 2 shows that the
problems of declining per capita income and high inflation date from the
second half of the l970s.
Table 2Growth and Inflation
(percent per year)
1950-60 1960-70 1970-75 1975-801980-85
Growth Per Capita 2.8 2.6 1.6 -1.0 -4.2
Inflation 8.0 9.3 12.6 50.0 102.1
Source: Kuczynski (1977), Central Bank and Ministry of Finance
20See R. Thorp "Trends and Cycles in the PeruvianEconomy." in P.Bardhan et al
(eds.) International Trade. Investment. Macro Policies and Histor'q. North Holland,
1987, R.Thorp and G.Bertraa Peru 1890-1977, Columbia University Press, 1978; and
PP. Kuczynski Peruvian Democracy under Economic Stress, Princeton University Press,
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In the past 25 years, three major stop-go phases can be
discerned. The first was the Belaunde expansion which crashed in 1967-68.
The growth program faltered because it ran into external constraints.
Budget correction and real depreciation were undertaken and prepared the
ground for the economic expansion of the military government in the early
1970s. The extremely favorable world environment permitted a massive
expansion until 1974, with an average growth rate of per capita income of
3.7 percent per year in the 1969-74 period. Figure 3 shows the rapid
increase in real income during thIs period.
Deterioration of the terms of trade (a 27 percent decline
between 1974 and 1977) occurred at the same time that the government was
undertaking a massive investment program. As a result, the noninterest
current account balance showed a deficit of 6 percent of GDP in 1974-77.
This straining of external financing opportunities forced a slowdown of
growth and a reshaping of economic policies. Exchange rate and trade
policies introduced in 1978-79 emphasized export growth rather than
government spending. While the resource transfer had been inward in 1973-
78, now came three years of large external (noninterest) surpluses.
The second Belaunde administration (1980-85) had to cope with
extraordinarily adverse conditions. Belaunde inherited an economy with
deep social problems: Per capita income had declined since 1974 and, the
external balance improvement of the late 1.970s notwithstanding, the
interventionism of the military government had created pervasive
distortions. The possibility of advancing the economy was drastically32
limited as a result of a combination of shocks: the world recession of
1980-82, terms of trade deterioration, the explosion in world interest
rates and the resulting rise in debt service obligations, external credit
rationing, and natural disasters. These shocks combined to choke off any
room for expansion. In 1982-83, under an IMF program, real GDP per capita
declined by 16 percent and inflation nearly doubled to 112 percent.
The disastrous economic performance of the e1aunde government
led to a total rout in the elections and thus brought Alan Garcia into
power in 1985. In 1980 Belaunde had won the elections with the largest
majority in history. In contrast, in the 1985 elections, his party was
devastated in that they came out with a meager 6.2 percent of the vote!
Alan Garcia's APRA party took 45.8 percent of the vote, and the United
Left took another 21.3 percent.21
The election which swept Garcia into office in a landslide
victory carried one clear message: growth first!22 This message,
regardless of its feasibility, conditioned the economic policies of the
Garcia Administration from the very beginning and is now taking the
country to the brink.
11.2 The Heterodox Proram
In July 1985, the last month of the Belaunde administration,
inflation reached 250 percent at an annual rate. Unemployment was
21See Wise (1988) and Ortiz de Zevallos (1989) for a review of politics.












pervasive, idle capacity abounded, and real wages had been reduced in an
effort to cope with the external crisis. Against this background, Garcia's
government developed a populist project of expansion entitled "Growth with
Redistribution" emphasizing economic recovery combined with disinflation.
Premises and Policies: Three points are central to an understanding of why
economic policy took the form it did. The first is the impressively
unequal distribution of income. Figure 6 shows the Peruvian distribution
with a diagram widely used in Peru. The striking fact is that 1% of the
population receives nearly half the national income.23
The second is that policy makers were impressed with the large
gap between actual and potential output. In Carbonetto et al (1987, p.14),
it is estimated that actual output was only 66 percent of potential output
in 1984 leaving a 34 percent gap to be made up by the judicious choice of
policy.
The third consideration is that Peruvian economists, in company
with economists throughout Latin America, were unimpressed with the
effectiveness of IMF programs. It will be remembered that at this time
Israel and Argentina made their hecerodox stabilization efforts, as did
8razil shortly afterwards. The orthodox approach to stabilization had been
discredited by the strong recessionary effects and the absence of any
success stories. The alternative, heterodoxy, had all the appeal of
23See Glewwe (1988).34
offering an end to inflation without the attendant Costsof
unemployment.24
Against this background, the general theme of economic policy is
summarized in the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1986-90 (p.6) from which we
quote extensively.
"The new economic policy seeks to pass from an economy of conflict
and speculation to one of production and consensus. In this economy
it is possible to make compatible stability, growth, distribution and
development in a Context of national planning which finds concrete
expression in dialogue and social and economic concertation.
Planning of economic development will be full, decentralized and
participatory and concertation will center on the effort to make
compatible the generation of saving and productive investment with
attention paid to the undelayable priority attention to social needs.
We need to reconcile economic efficiency with social equity in a
productive dynamics which is fundamentally sustained by domestic
resources."
Specific premises and prescriptions in the national development strategy
can be paraphrases as follows :(op. cit. p.63-65)
• The complementarity of internal and external markets,
rejecting the apparent dilemma between import substitution and
exports and reaffirming the primacy of the internal market.
• The necessity to redistribute income as a means for sustained
growth and the possibility to bring together with the redistribution
process the necessary capacity to save and invest.
The heterodox management of economic policy starts from a
reinterpretation of traditional economic concepts in termsoftheir
implications for the Peruvian economy.
•Prices and Rentability: Profitability cannot increase from an
increase in profit margins because that would lead to a generalized
decline in sales. Smaller margins yield lower prices, higher demand,
higher sales and better utilization of capacity; higher sales allow a
fuller scale of production.
24See Dornbusch (1981, 1988a), Bresser Pereira and Nakano (1987) and Brunoetal.
(1988).35
•Salaries and Profitability: The generalized and open-ended
restraint on wages reduces profitability because it reduces workers'
purchasing power, bringing about recessive effects that reduce demand
and thus the benefits of dynamic economy.
• The Recessive, Inflationary Crisis: This follows from the
increase in costs and the fall in demand, not from an excess in
demand. The contraction of public spending, credit and salaries
reduces demand; at the same time devaluation and increases in
interest rates incessantly raise costs. To talk of excess demand is
erroneous when there idle capacity in almost all sectors and ample
supply of unemployed labor.
• The Fiscal Deficit: The fiscal deficit is not necessarily
inflationary. It only is if domestic demand exceeds potential output.
With substantial idle capacity there is a need for a certain
deficit.
• Money Creation: Must increase demand, thus allowing an
increase in real liquidity and disponibility since the opposite would
slow growth.
• Interest Rates: Increased real interest rates do not raise
saving, since the latter depends fundamentally on income, but they
discourage productive investment...
• Exchange Rate: Depreciation of the exchange rate does not
constitute an effective means of balancing the external accounts
since only 15% of imports and 20% of exports are sensitive (elastic)
to exchange rate changes. As a consequence, although it is necessary
to avoid devaluation, the external flows must be handled by more
efficient selective methods.
The specific targets of the economic program are set out in
Table 3.
Table 3 The 1986-90 Economic Development Plan
19851986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Growth
GDP 1.4 6.5 6.26.1 6.36.2
Consumption 0.1 8.5 6.35.7 5.05.2
Exports 3.5-13.6 4.85.8 5.95.9
Imports -24.6 5.013.711.9 5.67.4
Investment -12.3 12.0 14.411.8 11.6 10.7
Budget Deficita 0.6 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.6
a Percent of GDP
Source: Presidencia dela Republica (1986)36
The new economic policy was based on four measures, as noted in
Carbonetto et al (1987,p.lS):
• Rapid expansion of effective demand via real wage increases.
• Financial de-strangulation to give firms relief and contain
cost pressures by reducing financial costs of enterprises, effective
interest rates, indirect taxes and other elements of costs.
• Reestablishment of selective exchange rates and abandonment of
the devaluation policy.
• The external accounts are to be kept in balance by growth in
exports, import substitution and limitations on debt service tobe
compatible with acceptable growth. Of course, many of the foreign exchange
and growth policies on which any success of the plan might depend never
saw the light of day. This is particularly the case for foreign exchange
savings strategies.
External Debt: The most widely noted measure of the Garcia government is
no doubt the limitation of external debt service to 10 percent of exports.
The move followed a policy of quiet arrears of the elaunde government. It
attracted attention because it was openly unilateral and thus potentially
invited sanctions from the commercial bank creditors. The policy made the
best of a situation where a conventional rescheduling, including an IMF
agreement, was entirely impossible from a political point of view. Since
then, debt service arrears have been extended to official creditors,
including the IMP and the World Bank.
The policy of limiting debt service was not only an essential
step on the political front. It effectively suspended the external
constraint. With the foreign exchange savings resulting from limited debt37
service, a widening of the trade deficit became possible. Thus external
constraints on growth, and the resulting need for realistic exchange rate
policies, were suspended, at least for some time. That temporary reprieve,
as we will see below, was already exhausted by mid-1988.
The quality of Peruvian debt, as viewed by the secondary market,
has steadily declined since 1985. In July 1985, when Mexican debt traded
at 60 cents on the dollar. Brazilian at 75 cents and Argentinean at 60
cents, Peruvian already was down to only 45 cents. By January 1986, the
price had declined to only 25 cents per dollar face value. By the end of
1987, the external debt stood at $16.6 billion, with arrears on principal
and interest of $6.1 billion. By early 1989 Peruvian debt could be bought
at 5 cents per dollar. The low price is certainly explained by one single
factor: it would be exceptionally difficult politically to achieve a
stabilization in which real worker incomes were cut for the purpose of
external debt service.
The First TwoYearsThe immediate priority for the Garcia administration
was to introduce a "heterodox" program of stabilization: inflation
reduction via an incomes policy combined with a massive reactivation of
the economy.
In the short term, the heterodox program was immensely
successful. Inflation declined sharply (as showninTable 4), employment
increased, and the real wage was pushed up substantially (as shown in











1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 198938
above the level of 1985! Growth, too, had been very substantial. In 1986,
the economy grew by 9,5 percent; and, in 1987, by another 6.7 percent.
Table 4 Peruvian Macroeconomic Indicators
1985 1986 1987 1988
Inflationa 158 63 115 1722
Growth 2.5 9.5 6.9 -8.4
Real wageb 111 127 138 106
Trade Balance ($)1173 -67 -463 -84
Cov't. RevenuesC 42.7 32.1 25.9 23.5
aDecember December b Index 1975—100 cpercent of CD?
Source: World Bank, Ministry of Finance, National Institute of Planning.
It is important to recognize just how successful the heterodox
approach is. Given enough foreign exchange and a depressed economy.
expansion of domestic demand can work. In fact, the success is broadly
shared because the recovery of demand can raise firsts' profitability by
raising capacity utilization. That was, in fact, the case. A year after
the program started Garcia was celebrated by the business class for the
success of his recovery strategy. Private investment increased by 24
percent in 1986 and another 18.6 percent in 1987.25
By early 1987, the program was at the peak of its success: real
GD? had grown cumulatively more than 20 percent since the third quarter of
1985. Inflation had been reduced from 188 percent to only 75 percent. But
while thesuccesswas startling, the strain was starting to appear in
rising cost pressures and a growing loss of foreign exchange. But these
strains, while obvious to economists, were far from alarming to policy
25See Centro de Economia Applicada (1988) and especially Iguinez for an evaluation
of the first three years of the program.39
makers or the public.
The Turning Point: The turning point came in July 1987, ahead of the
economic unravelling of the program, as a result of a proposal to
nationalize the banking system. On July 27th, 1987, President Garcia
declared: 26
"In Peru, today, the financial system is the most powerful instrument
of concentration of economic power and thus of political influence;
itisthe major obstacle to the democratization of production and the
accumulation of the surplus."
The immediate motivation for the nationalization was to get a
hand in the allocation of credit and a better control of the saving
generated by the business sector. Control of the financial system was also
expected to help monitor profits and capital flight by the privileged
groups in the economy. The private financial system was reproached for not
belongingto the necessities of economic development", with large parts
of the country's saving being channelled by the few rich families who
captured these savings into inventories, nonproductive assets, or accounts
abroad.
The nationalization crisis represents the beginning of open,
dramatic political conflict. It represented the moment where the right,
with public appearances of Vargas Lhosa, dramatized the shift in
government policies toward socialism. It also represented the end of the
26See Presidencia de la Republica (1987b,p.l).40
recovery policy and the turning point toward inflation and foreign
exchange crises. Although the bottlenecks opened up only gradually, during
the remainder of 1987, it is fair to say that July-August of that year
represented the turning point, after which the continuation of
expansionary policies could no longer be defended.
Populist programs such as that practiced in Peru fail when the
economy runs out of foreign exchange and when the controls that support
the initial redistribution and expansion have to be dismantled. By late
1987, growth was petering out and inflation, brought about by external
constraints, bottlenecks and the adjustment of severe price distortions,
was exploding.
To understand what went wrong it helps to return to the basic
philosophy of the program which is fully documented in a book, El Peru
Heterodoxo: Un Modelo Economico, the economic architects of the program
published in July, 1987.27 The most striking revelation of this book is
the extraordinary extent to which policy makers in the Garcia
administration diverged from accepted economics. Thus we learn (p.75-7)
that
"An examination of the Peruvian record reveals that periods of
moderate inflation are associated with expansionary fiscal policies.
And periods of major inflation are associated with fiscal restraint.
Thus, the record shows exactly the opposite of what is predicted by a
theory which explains inflation by fiscal deficits."
27See D.Carbonetto, I.de Cabellos, O.Dancourt, C.Ferrari, D.Martinez, J.Mezzera,
G.Saberbein, J.Tantalean, and P.Vigier El Peru Heterodoxo. Un Modelo EcononCO,
National Planning Institute, Lima, 1987.41
And, to dispel any doubts:(p.82)
"If it were necessary to summarize in two words the economic strategy
adopted by the government starting in August 1985 they are control
(meaning control of prices and costs and recognizing that this could
be done only temporarily for the first twelve month) and spend,
transferring resources to the poorest so that they increase
consumption and create a demand for increased output, thus
'justifying' that idle capacity be put to use.
It is necessary to spend, even at the Cost of a fiscal deficit,
because, if this deficit transfers public resources to increased
consumption of the poorest they iemand more goods and this will bring
about a reduction in unit costs. Thus the deficit is not
inflationary, on the contrary! This constitutes without doubt the
basic premise on which the economic team acted and the major
departure from the earlier strategy that had emphasized adjustment
from the demand side"
Peru learned in 1987-88 that continued rapid growth and massive
real wage increases are incompatible with moderate inflation. In 1986,
inflation was only 63 percent, far below the level at which the program
started. Eut the experience of high growth with moderate inflation, after a
while, became an artifact of the controls and subsidies on public sector
prices and on foreign exchange. Subsidies and controls were used to avoid
price increases in politically sensitive areas. In 1987-88, most petroleum
products sold at one-third their July 1985 price. Electricity prices, the
price of rice, and bus fares had declined by more than a third, as had the
real price of foreign exchange.42
Table 5 Real Levels of Controlled Prices
(July 1985—100)
Dec.1986 Dec. 1987 Dec. 1988
Averagea 75 59 58
Rice 73 61 47
Light Elect. 49 40 16
Telephone 84 87 32
Gas 58 33 25
aWe ighted by expenditure shares
Source: Apovo
When adjustments in the controlled prices had to be made,
inflation accelerated rapidly. Initially, the real wage gains and demand
expansion pushed up inflation, but the catching up of lagging prices became
increasingly important as the government had to undo, at least in part, the
large drop in the real prices of subsidized goods, of foreign exchange, and
of controlled goods. In 1987, inflation already reached 115 percent; and,
by early 1988, the program was unraveling as inflation exploded. In the
first quarter, it reached 470 percent per month. In March 1988, inflation
at an annual rate already exceeded 1000 percent; and the year closed with a
December-December inflation of 1.722 percent. In December itself, the
annualized rate of inflation was in excess of 6000 percent. Even at the end
of 1.988, after repeated attempts to realign controlled prices, the real
level of prices in the public sector remained at less than 60 percent of
their 1985 level.
Inflation was also a result of the massive increase in the
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real tax collection increased the budget deficit. In 1975-86, tax
collection had averaged above 12 percent of CD?, and in 1985, it rose to
13.2 percent. By 1988, because of a sharp decline in compliance, tax
collection had fallen to only 7.5 percent of GDP.
The decline in revenue and the large cost of subsidy programs,
including interest subsidies in credit markets, created a vast budget
deficit. TheCentralBanks policy of multiple exchange rates contributed
an important part of the deficit. It involved losses amounting to 2 percent
of CNP from buying foreign exchange at a high price from exporters and
selling it at a low or subsidized price to importers.
Table 6 Public Sector Financing Requirement
(Percent of GDP)
1985 1986 1987 1988*
Overall Public Sector Deficit 4.4 6.7 9.9 6.1
Budget Deficit 2.4 4.9 6.5 5.3
Central Bank Losses 1.9 1.8 2.8 0.8
Credit to Development Banks 0.8 1.4 1.9 0.8
Public Sector Financing Requirement 5.1 8.1 11.2 6.9
Domestic Financing 1.2 5.7 9.8 6.9
*Es timate
Source: World Bank, Central Bank and Ministry of Finance
The Large budget deficit had increasingly detrimental effects on
the economy's performance. It directly contributed to inflation, but it
also affected the allocation of credit and hence investment. While foreign
exchange reserves lasted, the government could sell off foreign exchange
rather than borrow in the home market or print money. Now, with reserves44
precariously low, there was no room left for further reserve sales to
finance the deficit.28 (See Figure 6) The declining reserves now forced a
more consistent exchange rate policy which immediately raised the inflation
rate.29 Thus external financing of the budget deficit ultimately had an
inflationary cost, even though it may have been delayed by a year or two.
Another way to finance the deficit was through the banking
system. High reserve ratios for banks or direct financing requirements
effectively achieved this. The counterpart of this policy was a 30 percent
decline in real bank credit to the private sector in the past three years.
The Central Bank could finance the deficit by printing money. That, too,
had occurred and was one of the reasons for the accelerating inflation.
Since September 1987, the World Bank and Peruvian authorities
have been discussing stabilization. But the political impetus for major
policy changes so far has been missing. The only impetus for change came
from the external balance side where a crisis has been building up quite
visibly. The trade surplus of above $1 billion in 1985 had become a deficit
by 1987. Reserves declined by over $1 billion to the point where net
reserves were negative at the beginning of 1988. The response to the
looming foreign exchange crisis was a major real depreciation in late 1987.
This depreciation was one of the reasons for the sharp acceleration of
inflation.
28The net reserves included on the liability side $800 million of arrears to the
IMF. The gold position of the central bank had been revalued at various points and
amounted to $659 billion in December, 1988.
By April 1989 the decline in economic activity and the restrictions of imports had
become so massive that art actual reserve recovery had taken place. The reserve gains
were surficient to feed a rumor of another reactivation program.45
The real depreciation helped stem capital flight and the
widening trade deficit for some time. In a vicious cycle, accelerating wage
and price increases which were triggered by this depreciation eroded the
initial gain in competitiveness. The renewed real appreciation of the real
exchange rate for imports since the end of 1987. and the resulting exchange
losses of the central bank, signal the government's inability to force a
real depreciation. And that simply foreshadows a certain foreign exchange
crisis. In other sectors, too, real prices remain grossly misaligned as we
already saw above in Table 5. This is the case for interest rates as well
as for politically sensitive prices.
11.3 tThat Next?
y early 1989, there were less than $500 million in foreign
exchange left as reserves. Another $628 million in gold were available, but
trade had become a hand-to-mouth operation. Ships would not unload until
receipt of payment abroad was confirmed. From this position, the Peruvian
economy could move in one of three directions. The first possibility is a
draconian stabilization. This would require a drastic increase in real tax
revenues, a unification and real depreciation of the exchange rate, and a
realignment of those relative prices which today sustain the overly high
real wage. Policy reforms intheseareas must eliminate the budget deficit
and lessen the external constraint. The cost would be a decline in real
wages and hence, at least in the short term,a reduction in growth of
output andemployment. Interms of Peruvian history, this amountS to a46
1983-style program which is "politically impossible".Of course, that does
not mean it will not happen. It merely means that itwill come too late and
hence will be far more expensive in economic and political terms.
The second possibility is a gradual stabilization, supported by
increased tax compliance, exchange rate reform, and external supportfrom
improved export prices or resources provided by foreign governments.Many
debtor countries have the capability of incurring arrears on interest
payments or amortization of their externaldebt. This provides them with a
temporary cushion on the foreign exchange sidewhile gradual adjustments
are made. Peru has already used and fully exhausted that capability:debt
service was halted in 1985, and there now is a deficit even without
interest payments. Only fresh external resources (net transfers) can dothe
job, but it is difficult to know whence they might come. The main reasonto
contemplate such a possibility at all is political. The U.S. has a lot at
stake if Peru, as a result of political disintegration, comes to the brink.
The growing power of the United Left and extremism of the Shining Path
suggest possibilities much more difficult to live with than Nicaragua.But
it is extremely unlikely that a stabilization program with external support
would fall from heaven; more likely it would be the maiden gift after a
right wing coup.
The third, and the most likely way, is a gradual but
accelerating disintegration of the Peruvian economy. As the growing foreign
exchange crisis forces more and more rapid depreciation, there will be
demands for the maintenance of real wages. With both wages and the exchange47
rate showing accelerating inflation, prices will quickly follow. In fact,
to avoid mammoth deficits or violent strikes, the government will be forced
to run a fully indexed economy. But even as the economy becomes fully
indexed, the real exchange rate has to be brought down and real public
sector prices must rise. Accelerating inflation is the only way that can
happeit: prices and the exchange rate have to outrun wage increases, even as
wages try to catch up. Moreover, as prices, the exchange rate and wages
chase each other not only the size of increases but also the frequency of
adjustments increase. Adjustment periods shrink from a year to, the
adjustment to hyperinflation. Pazos (1972, p.92-3) has described the
dynamics as follows:
"When the rate of inflation approaches the limit of tolerance, a
growing number of trade unions ask for raises before their contracts
become due. And management grants them. These wage increases give an
additional push to inflation and bring about a further reduction of
the adjustment interval. Probably the interval is initially shortened
to six months, and then, successively, to three months, one month,
one week, and one day. At first the readjustment is based onthe
cost-of-living index; but since there is a delay of one or twomonths
or more in the publication of this index, it must soon be replaced by
another. The best-known and more up-to-date of the possible
indicators in Latin America is the quotation of a foreign currency,
generallythe U.S. dollar."
The process is well underway,asinflation was running at an
annualrate of 6000 percent at the end of 1988. Thefinancial
disintegration was apparent in the massive demonetization ofthe economy
whichwas so significant that financing of the budget deficit wasnot
consistent with stable inflation even at this incredible level.Real48
wages, as seen in Figure 4 above, had declined to alevel far below 1985,
the starting point of the program.
Somewhere in this process, the government might fall. But even
that would not solve the problems of an economy where the basic fight is
about income distribution. While foreign exchange reserves lasted, the
country could spend more than the whole pie and grow in relative harmony.
With reserves gone, the real income gains have to be paid back unless they
can be earned by sharply higher productivity. Peru today is far away from
the kind of policy reform that would try to make the best of its
resources; and, hence, maximum pessimism is warranted.
Peruvian policy makers do not like to hear this, but the most
likely course of Peru is that taken by Chile under Allende in the period
from September 1970 to September 1973. The exact timing and details of the
Peruvian experience may not match that of Allende, but the broad outline
certainly does.
The unfortunate implication of having allowed so radical a
deterioration of the Peruvian economy is that there is no longer any broad
political support for reform. The center-left political concentration is
vanishing, and new poles of concentration are emerging far away from where
Garcia started his presidency: the right around de Soto and Vargas Llosa
which is agitating for a Chilean style free market approach, and the
United Left for whom the unfortunate nationalization of the banking system
in 1988 was merely a first step in the direction of pervasive
Socialization. And then there is, far off at the extreme left, the Shining49
Path whose vision is nothing short of a civil war along racial lines.
Against this background of deteriorating economics and politics, where
will the Peruvian economy be a year from now?
Economic mismanagement need not be shortlived. If the politics
are supportive end external destabilization is not a factor, such a regime
can last another year or even more. Garcia can make time by radicalizing
his ownpositionand policies in the direction of populism and increasing
government intervention. A massive program of nationalization and control
would give the government more than a few months of breathing space,
except if it were overthrown. Garcia could adopt a gradualist, reformist
policy and attempt a shift to the right! In the meantime, the political
scene remains relatively calm: coups are not in sight for one simple
reason: the right does not want to let Garcia off the hook, doing the hard
and ungrateful work of stabilizing the economy only to see Garcia come
back for another round. But while there is apparent stability, the extreme
reduction in living standards and the growing number of strikes do suggest
that surviving for another year, to the elections in April 1990, will not
be easy.
Just how far the disintegration of the economy has gone is
apparent from a surveyreported by Apovo, an economic consulting service
inPeru. Middle and upper income respondents predominantly indicated that
they would buy dollars given extra income. Of the lower income groups.
more than half reported that they would spend the extra incomeon food.50
IV.CONCLUDINGREMARK
IMF-tylepolicies, without concern for growth or social progress
may well establish short run financial stability, but they inevitably open
the door to yet another round of destructive reaction in the form of
populist policies.
It is clear that the two instances of populism discussed here
led to disastrous consequences for those who were meant to be the
beneficiaries. The central question then is whether populist policies are
outright unsustainable, or whether there is a variant which, properly
executed can in fact succeed. We leave to a further paper the elaboration
of the thesis that populist policies can succeed provided they stay far
clear of foreign exchange constraints, emphasize reactivation only for a
brief initial period and then shift to growth policies. Most importantly,
they need to their financing on an extremely orthodox fiscal policy and
rigorous tax administration. Within those restrictions, there is
significant room left for the redistributive objectives of populism.51
Table A-I Peru: Macroeconomic Indicators
CrowthaInflationa Terms of External Resource Real
Tradeb Debtc Transferd Wages
1970 7.3 5 100 3.68 4.1
1971 5.1 7 85 3.69 0.8
1972 5.8 7 80 3.83 1.0
1973 6.2 10 101 4.13 -0.6
1974 6.9 17 103 5.24 -5.4
1975 2.4 24 88 6.26 -9.8
1976 3.3 34 84 7.38 -5.6
1977 -0.3 38 79 8.57 -3.4
1978 -1.7 58 75 9.32 3.3
1979 4.3 67 100 9.33 12.5
1980 2.9 60 111 9.59 3.8 100
1981 3.0 73 104 9.63 -4.4 98
1982 0.9 73 94 11.1 -3.7 101
1983 -12.0 125 104 12.4 0.2 84
1984 4.7 112 96 13.3 4.5 70
1985 2.3 158 82 13.8 6.9 60
1986 8.9 63 64 14.4 -2.0 76
1987 6.5 115 61 15.4 -3.8 80
1988* -8.5 1720 16.2 53
*estimates aPercent per year, b Terms of Trade Index, 1970—100, c Total external
debt,Billion d Resource transfer abroad as apercent of GD?. Resource transfer is
measured in the national accounts as net exports excepting factor payments.52
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